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Abstract
We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and ghting capacities of di¤erent
groups matter for ethnic conict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of
potential conicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identied. The theory predicts conict
to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a
minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conict. For shar-
ing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality
in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.
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1 Introduction
The empirical literature on conict has found that the existence of natural resources and of ethnic
divisions make a country more prone to war (see e.g., Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004; Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005). Our goal in this paper is to provide a unied theoretical framework for
the study of multiple types of conict that takes into account natural resources, geography, and
ethnicity.
In every society, groups typically di¤er in political power, size, location, wealths, and shares of
the surplus from the extraction of natural resources in di¤erent regions. For all the combinations of
parameters capturing the above heterogeneities, we will characterize the equilibrium strategies and
outcomes. In particular, we focus on what set of initial conditions may induce peace, secessionist
conict, uncontested secession or centrist conict (i.e., conict with the aim of conquering the whole
state).
We will rst analyze the model when the government can select an optimal level of rent sharing,
which corresponds to a situation in which frictionless bargaining is possible. We will show that even
in this frictionless environment the mere presence of two types of conict incentives (secessionist and
centrist) for di¤erent combinations of resource and strength distributions may make it impossible
to reach a surplus sharing agreement that induces peace. In particular, our theory predicts that
costly conict is harder to avoid when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven
(i.e., when the homelands of a minority group are particularly resource rich) and when it is much
easier for a minority group to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conict. Intuitively, in such a
situation secession attempts are a salient option for the minority group, which leads to two salient
threat points that cannot be jointly addressed by bargaining.
After deriving the empirically testable implications of the new source of bargaining failure
that we uncover, we will turn to examine the implications of the model for the (realistic) cases in
which surplus sharing cannot be easily adjusted, corresponding to situations in which bargaining on
surplus shares is not frictionless.1 Clearly, when the rent share of the minority group is di¢ cult to
(credibly) change in the short run, this further reinforces the potential for conicts. Our framework
allows us to make detailed predictions on how parameter values map into various forms of outcomes.
Our model has also some simple but at the same time important implications for the discussion
on the role of power sharing agreements: A failure of "minimal strength proportionality" is most
1Whether this inability to negotiate comes from commitment problems, indivisibilities, agency problems, or one
source or another of asymmetric information, we will just take such causes as given and focus instead on the conse-
quences, for di¤erent types of conict. See Fearon (1995) and Jackson and Morelli (2010) for summary comparisons
of the causes of bargaining breakdown.
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likely to cause a centrist all-out conict, i.e., a war that will involve all the regions of the State,
whereas a secessionist conict has always a failure of "resource proportionality" among its causes.
Besides the novel type of bargaining failure result and the conceptual contribution about power
sharing, the contribution of the paper is in the detailed implications it allows us to draw and test
on the role of the geographic distribution of natural resources for the di¤erent types of conict.
The previous theoretical literature did not contain, in fact, such a characterization.2 Our model
is the rst one to focus on resource location and the initial distribution of natural resource rents
and wealth across di¤erent ethnic groups, and to study the ensuing incentives of di¤erent groups to
determine conict, distinguishing between cases in which the incentives lead to secessionist conict
and cases in which the civil war does not have secession at stake.
Several historical examples suggest that natural resource location matters indeed in reality.
When the presence of a local ethnic group coincides with large natural resource abundance con-
centrated in its region, this local ethnic group could be nancially better o¤ if it were independent
and may under some conditions have incentives to start secessionist rebellion. This corresponds for
example to the separatist movement in the now independent Timor-Leste, and the recent turmoil in
the oil-abundant regions of Nigeria. Also the rebellion of the Aceh Freedom Movement in Indonesia
starting in 1976 and the armed ght of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army beginning in 1983 can
to a large extent be explained by the abundance of natural resources in these separatist regions.3
Other countries where secessionist movements have been linked to large local natural resources
include Angola, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco and Papua New Guinea (see
Ross, 2004, for a discussion).
In all the cases above, an uneven natural resource distribution was amplied by ethnic divisions.
In contrast, if natural resources are absent or if natural resources (and political power) are evenly
dispersed in a country, there are typically few incentives for conict, even when there are ethnic
2Esteban and Ray (2010, 2010b) are mostly focused on the role of inequality and fractionalization, which we also
consider as an important set of fundamental reasons for conict, but they do not take the role played by natural
resources into account. Caselli and Coleman (2006) focus on the decision of the dominant ethnic group to exploit
or not the other groups in terms of the proceeds from extraction of natural resources, but do not take into account
how the geographic distribution and the economic features of natural resources a¤ect the risk of ethnic conict of
di¤erent kinds. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) build a dynamic version of a Hirshleifer-style model of conict over a
single contested renewable resource. Also Grossman and Mendoza (2003) use a dynamic framework to predict that
present resource scarcity and future resource abundance cause appropriative competition. Hodler (2006) nds that
natural resources lead to lower growth in fractionalized countries through the channel of more ghting. Caselli (2006)
studies elite behavior in resource abundant countries to discuss potential politico-economic channels for the resource
curse. Similarly, Fearon (2005) argues that natural resources can foster conict by weakening state capacity. Besley
and Persson (2009) emphasize that weak institutions, low income and large natural resources lead to a greater risk of
civil war. Van der Ploeg and Rohner (2010) study the two-way interaction between natural resource extraction and
conict, allowing for depletion speed and method to be endogenous.
3For a discussion of these cases see Ross (2004b).
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divisions.4 Similarly, when there are large amounts of natural resources available, but the society
is ethnically homogeneous, conict incentives are weak.5
We immediately turn now to present our basic model and bargaining failure result in section 2,
followed by the equilibrium characterization in section 3 of the di¤erent types of conict when other
forms of bargaining frictions make it di¢ cult to alter surplus sharing. The empirical implications
of this new framework are very rich, and hence we kindly ask the reader to wait for these until
sections 4 and 5: In section 4 we spell out all the implications and relate them to the existing
empirical evidence; in section 5 we perform our own estimations of some of the predictions using
novel panel data on the ethnic group level. Section 6 concludes. Appendices A to C contain some
supplemental material and Appendix D the description of our data.
2 Frictionless Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a country populated by two ethnic groups, i and j.6 The country is divided in two clearly
dened regions, 1; 2. We allow for di¤erent values of extractable natural resources in the regions
1 and 2, labeled r1 and r2, respectively.7 For simplicity, natural resource extraction and export of
such resources is the only activity in the country, and this sole activity is conducted by a unique
State rm. The group in power can control the sharing of the ensuing surplus.
There are n1i and n
2
i members of group i in regions 1 and 2 respectively, and n
1
j ; n
2
j of group j.
Assume that the two groups are to some degree concentrated in the two regions, as is very often
the case. In particular, assume n1i =n
2
i > n
1
j=n
2
j .
We assume that group j controls the government at the beginning of the game, which may
mean that group j is a majority group (nj = n1j + n
2
j > ni = n
1
i + n
2
i ) in a democracy, or simply
that j had won some conict for power in a prior period.
In this section we assume that group j in power can choose the shares ; (1 ) of the surplus
to be attributed to groups i and j, respectively, and we assume that none of the standard bar-
gaining frictions, like asymmetric information, agency, indivisibilities or commitment problems, are
present. However, in spite of the absence of the standard frictions, we will show that the interac-
4This is for example the case of countries like Benin or Mali, which have only few natural resources, or of small
oil-rich countries like Brunei or Qatar, where natural resources are evenly spread.
5Examples for this include Chile and Mongolia.
6We assume that ethnicity is the only cleavage, hence abstracting from class conict or other di¤erences within
groups that could induce di¤erent political alignments or coalitions to form. See Ray (2009) for a treatment of
multiple markers.
7The variables r1 and r2 capture the total value of rents, corresponding to the product of the amounts extracted
times their price. Hence, r1 and r2 increase when there are resource discoveries or when the world prices rise.
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tion of the three key variables described above, namely ethnic division, concentration of groups and
distribution of natural resources in the di¤erent regions, can create nonetheless reasons for conict.
There are four potential outcomes: peace (P ), secessionist conict (S), centrist (or all-out)
conict (C), and accepted secession (A). Secessionist conict refers to war started with the aim of
founding an independent State in one of the two regions, while centrist conict is about gaining the
control of the whole country. In this section we focus on the parameter values for which accepted
secession will never occur. This streamlines the analysis without loss of generality of the important
insights. In Appendix C we derive in detail for what parameter values accepted secession could
occur in this framework.
The time line of the sequential version of the game is as follows:
1. group j selects ;
2. Nature selects player i as next mover with probability , while with probability (1   ) j is
selected by Nature to be the only player with an opportunity to take violent actions;8
3. if i is the selected mover, i can choose between accepting the surplus sharing  arrangement
(action p), start a centrist war (action c), or request secession (action s), implying separation
of region 1 from region 2; if j is selected as the only potential mover, it can only choose
between action p and action c;9
4. if i accepts the surplus sharing arrangement (action p), the peaceful payo¤s are realized; if
i chooses a centrist conict (c), j has no choice but to ght back, in which case there is a
standard contest success function determining the outcome; nally, if i asked for secession
(s), then group j has the choice between accepting secession (a) and ghting against it (f), in
which case the di¤erent nature of the ght (regional as opposed to spread out) determines a
di¤erent contest success function. Similarly, if j is drawn by Nature, action p leads to peace,
and action c to centrist conict.
If peace (P) prevails, total group payo¤s from natural resources are
iP = (r1 + r2)
jP = (1  )(r1 + r2)
8 In Appendix B we present a simultaneous moves version of the model. All results go through, but the exposition
of section 3 would be messier with the simultaneous moves version.
9For simplicity, we ignore the (unrealistic) possibility that a group in power proposes secession of some region.
We could easily extend the framework to allow for it.
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On top of these ows of rents from selling oil or alike, each group may have control of a miscellaneous
of other sources of wealth or income, and we will denote the per capita usable stock of such non-
resource based wealth as wi; wj . These accumulated stocks are those that determine, together with
the relative population sizes, the strength of the two groups in case of conict, as we will see below.
There is an important di¤erence between wealth from natural resource rents and wealth from
industrial activity and the like. Typically only a small fraction of the former type of wealth is
destroyed in conict, while much of the latter type is often destroyed, because it is a vital input
of the capacity of a ghting group or State in a conict. Oil elds and diamond mines (and
especially their future productivity) "survive" ghting, while high-tech industries and banking
su¤er considerably from political instability.10 A similar argument could be applied to distinguish
between various sorts of natural resources, according to their risk of destruction in civil war.
If centrist all-out conict is initiated, we assume that the winner takes all the relevant nat-
ural resource rents in the relevant period. For simplicity the winner does not take instead the
undestroyed wealth stocks.11
Thus, the payo¤s for centrist conict (C) are as follows:
iC = pc(r1 + r2)  dwini
jC = (1  pc)(r1 + r2)  dwjnj
where pc is the winning probability of group i in centrist conict and d denotes the fraction of the
wealth stocks destroyed in the ghting. Conict is costly only in terms of destroyed capital. Adding
human losses would not alter the main results, but would make the analysis more tedious.12
The probability with which i wins a centrist conict can be expressed as:
pc =
niwi
niwi + njwj + 
where  measures the extra strength of group j due to the control of the government and perhaps
the army. In this contest success function (CSF) the ratio of total wealth matters. Like Jackson
and Morelli (2007) and Esteban and Ray (2010) we regard wealth as capacity, and therefore assume
10For these reasons, perhaps, full-blown conict could be avoided in the Basque country and the Flemish region,
even though their economic strength would give them incentives to split from Spain and from Belgium respectively.
11Our qualitative results go through when we include additional punishment means like wealth expropriation. The
distinction between allowing the winner to take over also the stocks or not would probably matter more in a potential
dynamic extension of the model.
12 In a complementary paper, Esteban, Morelli and Rohner (2010) deal explicitly with the strategic incentives to
decimate the population of enemies.
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a groups probability of winning to be increasing in its total wealth.13
The logic of secessionist conict is similar. We assume that when group is secession attempt is
unsuccessful, i is deprived of all resource rents during the present period. Again, we could allow for
further punishment without a¤ecting the qualitative results. When secession is successful, region 1
splits and group i gains control over all resources in region 1. The minorities in the new countries
n1j and n
2
i are discriminated and do not receive anything.
The group leaders have a utilitarian social welfare function with equal weights for any group
member independent of her location, i.e., they simply maximize the total rents. Again, conict
destroys a part d of the wealth in the conict zone. Hence, the payo¤s under secessionist conict
are:
iS = psr1   dwin1i
jS = (1  ps)r1 + r2   dwjn1j
where ps is the winning probability of group i in secessionist conict, which can be expressed as
follows:
ps =
n1iwi
n1iwi + n
1
jwj + 
:
Note that in case of a secessionist conict the men used are only those in the conict region.14
The last possible outcome is accepted secession (A), which occurs when group i attempts
secession (action s) and group j accepts the proposal without ghting (action a). In this case:
iA = r1
jA = r2
Clearly, group i would always prefer accepted secession to secessionist conict. In contrast,
the ruling group j prefers to "ght out" secession attempts when ghting is not too costly, i.e.,
13Another interpretation of this formula and the destruction cost of war is that groups select what part of their
wealth they want to invest as sunk cost in conict. If they are constraint to not be able to invest more than d percent
of their wealth and if this constraint is binding for both groups, this would lead exactly to the formula above and the
corresponding costs of war.
14We could easily add some parameter to account for the fact that mountainous terrain, geographical remoteness,
ideological recruitment etc provide a larger advantage for group i in secessionist than in centrist wars (cf. Gates,
2002; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009).
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dwjn
1
j < (1 ps)r1.15 In the present section we focus on situations where this condition holds, which
allows us to disregard the possibility of accepted secession. In Appendix C we show that when this
condition does not hold there is an additional zone of parameter values for which bargaining fails
to prevent accepted secession.
2.2 Equilibrium
The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. On the basis of the expected outcomes for
each group in all subgames for any , group j selects the preferred level of  at the beginning of
the game. Appendix A contains all the tedious algebra steps, but the following description of the
analysis should be su¢ cient to understand what is going on.
Clearly, the choice of  can be reduced to a binary choice between  = 0 and the "buying o¤"
minimum level of  making group i indi¤erent between accepting and challenging. The endoge-
nously selected  depends on . For high , i.e., when it is likely that group i can have a window
of opportunity to challenge the status quo if exploitative, j chooses the "buying o¤" strategy for a
wider range of parameter values.
While for many parameter values there exists an  that can prevent conict, we will show that
this is not always the case, regardless of  and regardless of the timing of the game. This bargaining
failure result, holding in spite of the availability of credible transfers, and hence in contrast with
the "political Coase theorem" in Acemoglu (2003), is the main punchline of this section.
To explain the intuition right away, note rst that group j prefers peace to centrist conict
when     pc + dwjnjr1+r2 , while group i prefers peace to centrist and secessionist conict for
  c  pc   dwinir1+r2 , resp.   s  ps r1r1+r2  
dwin
1
i
r1+r2
(see Appendix A for details). Due to the
destruction of war c <  always holds. In line with standard intuition in the presence of a single
form of conict, transfers could always assure peace, as the destruction of war creates some peace
dividend to be distributed (d(wini+wjnj)r1+r2 ).
Things are di¤erent, however, in the presence of multiple conicts. For a range of parameter
values, s >  holds. In these cases no level of  can be found for which conict can always be
avoided. This result does not hinge on the sequential structure of Nature drawing the mover, as
the bargaining failure result holds for the same parameter values even in the simultaneous move
game in Appendix B. Our bargaining failure result can be summarized in the rst proposition of
the paper:16
15As a tie-breaking rule, we assume throughout the paper that in the case of strict indi¤erence between two actions,
groups select the one that leads to less destructive outcomes.
16Technically we should talk about group j not being able to nd an interior value of  that can avoid war, but it
is basically a bargaining failure result, because the same impossibility to obtain certain peace under those conditions
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Proposition 1 There exist parameter values under which no surplus sharing exists that can avoid
a conict.
Proof. See case 3 in Appendix A, where ps r1r1+r2 > pc +
d(win
1
i+wjnj)
r1+r2
=) s > .
It is easy to see that this type of bargaining failure is more likely when r1 is su¢ ciently large,
and when ps=pc is large. The intuition here is that when r1 or ps=pc become too small, secessionist
conict becomes less attractive and we would fall back into a situation with only one form of salient
threat (i.e., centrist conict). Further, when accumulated usable wealth is small compared to the
"cake" from natural resources, and conict is not very destructive (small d) it is harder to avoid
war.
Using the explicit dependence of ps and pc on the distribution of populations of the di¤erent
groups in the territory, the condition for bargaining failure becomes
n1iwi
n1iwi + n
1
jwj + 
r1
r1 + r2
>
niwi
niwi + njwj + 
+
d(win
1
i + wjnj)
r1 + r2
:
This reveals that conict is more likely when the minority group i is very concentrated (large n1i )
and the corresponding region relatively homogeneous (low n1j ); and state capacity is low (i.e., low
). The results of the comparative statics implied by the characterization of Proposition 1 are
summarized below.
Corollary 1 Conict becomes more salient when
1. the winning chances of the minority are much better for secessionist than for centrist conict,
2. most of the natural resources are located in the region of the minority group,
3. a country is poor and/or war is not very destructive,
4. the minority group is very concentrated in a relatively homogeneous region,
5. state capacity is low.
This characterization can be displayed graphically in terms of n1i , r1 and d (cf. Figures 1-3).
17
We conclude this section by illustrating that the bargaining failure due to multiple types of
conict can occur even in a democracy. Consider the following "poor democracy" example:
would arise under any other bargaining procedure to set surplus sharing.
17The following parameter values have been used for the variables not appearing in each gure: r1 = 0:8, r2 = 0:2,
ni = nj = 1, wi = wj = 1,  = 0, n1j = 0:3, n
1
i = 0:7, d = 0:05. The zone "bargaining sustains peace" refers to
outcomes P or A.
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Figure 1: Bargaining failure in terms of n1i and d
d
r1
0.1
0.5 1
Bargaining
sustains
peace
0.05 Bargaining
failure
Figure 2: Bargaining failure in terms of r1 and d
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r1
ni1
1
0.5 1
Bargaining sustains peace0.5
Bargaining failure
Figure 3: Bargaining failure in terms of n1i and r1
Example 1 Consider a proportional democratic benchmark, in which surplus sharing is determined
by vote strength, i.e., D = nini+nj and where there is perfect wealth equality, i.e., wi = wj. When
the country is poor (low w) and / or conict is not very destructive (low d), and if an ethnic
minority is very concentrated in an area with large resource rents (high n1i and high r1), even such
perfect democracy in an egalitarian society cannot guarantee peace.
Basically, as soon as our bargaining failure condition holds, s > , even "fair" surplus sharing
in a perfect democracy cannot prevent conict. In the worst case scenario we can even end up in
a situation where any of the two groups would like to start war because s > D > .18 This
can occur when the minority group is very concentrated (large n1i =n
1
j ), when the geographical
distribution of natural resources is unequal (high r1), the country is poor and conict is not very
destructive (small dw), and when state capacity is neither too small nor too large (intermediate
). For these parameter values either group that has a window of opportunity would like to start
conict.
In a dynamic snapshot interpretation, even though the two groups are equally well o¤ from
the past and democracy has already been achieved, a new conict can erupt because of regional
resources plus ethnic conict interaction when r1 jumps su¢ ciently high. In contrast to the con-
ventional wisdom that stresses the importance of democracy for peace, when s > D > , a
shift away from proportional democracy towards a non-democratic regime ND, with ND > s
or ND < , can reduce the frequency of war (making it dependent on ), but without eliminat-
18Expressed in structural parameters, this corresponds to n
1
iwi
n1iwi+n
1
jwj+
r1
r1+r2
  dwin1i
r1+r2
> ni
ni+nj
> niwi
niwi+njwj+
+
dwjnj
r1+r2
.
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ing it. Note also that if we start from one of these non democratic surplus sharing regimes, for
example with an  below , the most promising policies to establish peace would be related to
fostering development rather than pushing democracy. In the next section we instead show that in
the presence of bargaining frictions and when countries are less poor there are indeed cases where
democratic power sharing can reduce conict.
3 Fixed Surplus Sharing
In many cases it is not feasible to signicantly change  in the short run in reaction to stochastic
shocks such as resource discoveries. A substantial part of surplus sharing goes through patronage
spending for ethnic employment, which typically takes much time to change. In Northern Ireland,
for example, it took decades to democratize the police force and to make sure that the fully
protestant force could become religiously mixed. Also reforms of scal systems and inter-regional
transfers need years to be implemented. Think of the debate on sharing Scotlands oil wealth.
Scotland now has a local parliament and receives the highest per capita public spending in the
UK from Westminster, but it had to wait for decades. When such rigidities make it impossible to
adapt  to changing conditions, our model yields some additional predictions with respect to those
already obtained in the previous section.
When  < s, of course it does not matter whether  is easy or hard to change. Now we want
to focus on situations in which the additional rigidities in changing  can lead to conict even if
 > s.
Group i prefers peace to accepted secession when   a  r1r1+r2 . To eliminate uninteresting
cases, we assume  > a. Note also that 
i
A > 
i
S and accordingly a > s always holds (this
helps us to simplify some of the following expressions).
The proposition below fully characterizes the di¤erent outcomes for all xed levels of .
Proposition 2  When  > , centrist conict triggered by group j occurs with probability
(1  ), and peace prevails otherwise.
 When   , peace occurs if group i does not have the opportunity to take action against
the status quo (probability (1   )), whereas with probability  i has a chance to choose its
preferred action, and the following possibilities arise:
Peace occurs under the two following su¢ cient conditions: (I)   max fc; ag; (II)
  max fc; sg and dwjn1j < (1 ps)r1. (I) and (II) together are a necessary condition.
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Centrist conict occurs under the following su¢ cient conditions: (III)  < c and
r2 >
(1 pc)r1+dwini
pc
; (IV)  < c and r2 >
(ps pc)r1+dwi(ni n1i )
pc
and dwjn1j < (1  ps)r1.
(III) and (IV) together are a necessary condition.
 Secessionist conict occurs under the following necessary and su¢ cient condition: (V)
 < s and r1  pcr2 dwi(ni n
1
i )
ps pc and dwjn
1
j < (1  ps)r1.
Accepted secession occurs under the following necessary and su¢ cient condition: (VI)
 < a and r1  pcr2 dwini1 pc and dwjn1j  (1  ps)r1.
Proof. Follows from the comparison of the payo¤ functions for the various outcomes.
The four relevant zones of parameters for the di¤erent outcomes are displayed in Figure 4 below.
The same parameter values are used as in the gures before, the only di¤erence being that now we
focus on a case where conict is more destructive (d = 0:3), which creates a larger "peace dividend"
and always would prevent bargaining failure if  could be freely and easily changed.
The zone "Peace" corresponds to parameter values where the peaceful status quo always persists,
independently of the identity of the rst mover. In the zone "Centrist Conict" on top of the gure
(i.e., above ), centrist conict occurs when group j moves rst, and peace holds when group i is the
rst mover. In contrast, in the four zones at the bottom of this gure, the indicated outcomes occur
when group i is the rst mover, while for group j moving rst peace is sustained. In particular,
for exploitatively low levels of , centrist conict dominates for low and intermediate levels of r1,
peacefully accepted secession occurs for intermediate levels of r1, and secessionist conict takes
place for a high r1.19
It is hard to think of historical cases in which  is so high that the dominant group would like
to start centrist conict, as the ruling elite usually nds ways to guarantee that the status quo is in
their favor. Hence, in the discussion below we will only focus on situations where  < , in which
therefore the incentives for the minority group i are most salient.
The power share  can be compared to two benchmarks: the relative military strength of group
i, i.e.,  R pc = niwiniwi+njwj+ , and the relative resources, i.e.,  R
r1
r1+r2
. Thus, power sharing has
two potential benchmarks: "minimum strength proportionality"20 and "resource proportionality".
All the above analysis has an important conceptual corollary that relates to the role of proportional
power sharing for peace:
19A similar characterization could be achieved with simultaneous moves (see Appendix B). In that case a key
variable determining the various cases is whether a group is able to escalate a secessionist conict into a centrist
all-out conict or vice versa, rather than depending on a random draw of Nature like in the sequential move version.
20This concept is labeled "minimum strength proportionality" because we relate  to pc, where pc < ps.
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Figure 4: The di¤erent outcomes with a xed rent share
Corollary 2 When the minority group i starts a centrist conict that aims to take over the control
of the State, a failure of "minimum strength proportionality" of the initial power sharing arrange-
ment is always involved.
On the other hand, when we observe a secessionist conict, the initial power sharing must have
failed to satisfy "resource proportionality".
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.
Intuitively, when a group is militarily strong, mostly the "minimum strength proportionality"
condition is salient, while for a minority group with resource-rich homelands the "resource propor-
tionality" criterion becomes binding. This becomes also apparent in Figure 4: When r1 increases
group i requires a larger  to maintain peace (note that the upper bound of the "Secessionist
Conict" zone is increasing in r1). Similarly, in this same gure an increase in pc would extend
upwards the height of the two "Centrist Conict" rectangles at the bottom of the gure, thereby
increasing the minimum level of  for which peace can be maintained.
To sum up, assume that the parameter values are such that we are not in the "bargaining
failure" range, and peace can always be sustained at least for some values of . In this context
power sharing can help preventing conict, by respecting the "minimum strength proportionality"
and/or "resource proportionality" criteria.
Empirically, having an equitable democracy with an intermediate value of  that is acceptable
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for both groups will reduce the risk of war onsets, in countries with a large enough "peace dividend"
that makes conict preventable. This is typically the case in intermediately or fully developed
countries (see Collier and Rohner, 2008).
4 Empirical Relevance of the Main Predictions
Our main goal has been to provide a framework to analyze the e¤ect of the distribution of natural
resources across regions and groups on the di¤erent types of civil conict. We now want to judge
the usefulness of this framework on the basis of the predictions it o¤ers. Since the propositions
provide a characterization of equilibrium in di¤erent relevant cases, we now want to esh out the
most interesting testable predictions that can be derived from such propositions and check how
they relate to the existing empirical literature.
1. The rst nuance that our model provides about the role of natural resources is that they pose
the greater challenge the more unevenly distributed they are on a territory. This result is both
present for the endogenous and for the xed rent sharing cases. A greater r1 basically implies
that ethnic divisions can be reinforced by the geographical distribution of natural resources.
In other words, when most natural resources are concentrated in the area of a local ethnic
group that is not politically dominant, secessionist civil tensions are very likely. The xed
rent sharing case also provides further predictions on what forms of conict we should expect:
For r1 > r2 we should observe more secessionist conicts, while for r1 < r2 centrist conicts
should be more frequent. Empirically, the secessionist conicts of Timor-Leste, Sudan or
Nigeria t the case of r1 > r2, while for example Angola is a compelling case of r1 < r2 and
centrist conict.21
2. Typically countries with huge export shares of (and per capita income from) natural re-
sources like for example Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar etc are small countries that due to their tiny
size almost by denition have an even distribution of natural resources. Interestingly, these
countries often achieve remarkable political stability. Countries with intermediate export
shares of natural resources, like Angola or Nigeria, are usually geographically larger and tend
21 Indeed, the two main factions in Angolas centrist conicts of the last four decades are the dominant MPLA
(group j) and the minority faction UNITA (group i). Angola is very rich in oil and diamonds, where especially the
latter play a big role, as they are among the best diamonds in the world. The diamonds are mostly concentrated in the
North-East of the country (in the Lunda provinces) and there most of the ghting takes place. The underlying ethnic
group of the UNITA rebels are the Ovimbundu who have their geographical homeland in the central Bié Plateau
region that is rather poor in natural resources. Thus, r1=(r1 + r2) is low. Also, the MPLA has been reluctant to
share power (low ), while the UNITA rebels have always focused mainly on trying to control the diamond mines.
In a nutshell, our model would predict centrist conict without secessionist goals between UNITA and MPLA, which
is exactly what we have observed.
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to have uneven distributions of natural resources. They are also frequently exposed to con-
ict. Hence, Collier and Hoe­ ers (2004) nding that countries with intermediate natural
resource exports over GDP are more likely to experience civil war could indeed be indirectly
related to the unevenness e¤ects described above.22
3. The model also predicts that conicts are particularly frequent in situations when the prob-
ability of the minority group of winning a secessionist conict is substantially larger than
of winning a centrist war. This is the case when the minority group is geographically very
concentrated in their homelands and when state capacity is weak. Consistent with this, Gates
(2002) and Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) nd that in situations where the rebelling mi-
nority group is concentrated in remote peripheral areas and ghts a localized war in this
region, its odds of winning are larger and conict tends to be harder to eradicate. Further,
Fearon (2005) and Besley and Persson (2009)s empirical results reect the importance of
state capacity to maintain peace.
4. Another interesting point is that wealth in general has very di¤erent implications from natural
resource abundance. A general increase in natural resources (i.e., larger r1 and r2) clearly
makes the peaceful status quo more di¢ cult to sustain, as shown in Proposition 1. This is
consistent with the empirical ndings in the literature that the rents from natural resources
monotonically increase the risk of civil war (e.g., Ross, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005;
Lujala, 2010).
5. The situation is somewhat di¤erent for non-resource wealth w. In Jackson and Morelli (2007)
the e¤ect of relative wealth on the probability of conict was ambiguous, because wealth was
the target of conict as well as its input. Here, the realistic assumption that natural resources
neither a¤ect the probability of winning nor are particularly a¤ected by wars eliminates that
ambiguity. We nd that higher wealth w decreases the risk of war, consistent with the
empirical results by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe­ er (2004). Moreover,
relative wealth changes would a¤ect the probability of conict of one kind or another only
through the consequences on the contest success function.
6. In our model both ethnic divisions and natural resource abundance (large r1 and r2) are nec-
essary conditions for conict. This is consistent with the empirical result of Lujala, Gleditsch
and Gilmore (2005), pointing out that diamonds only increase the risk of conict in the pres-
ence of ethnic fractionalization. Similarly, our framework is also in line with the nding that
22Another explanation for the non monotonic nding of Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) is o¤ered by Caselli and Coleman
(2006).
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violent secession attempts are most likely when ethnic groups are geographically concentrated
(Walter, 2006).
7. Further, ethnic cleavages are more likely to result in conict onsets when there are no power
sharing institutions in place (see Reynal-Querol, 2002; Saideman et al., 2002; Cederman and
Girardin, 2007). More specically, there is also evidence that political under-representation
leads to a higher risk of violent self-determination challenges (Walter, 2006). These empirical
ndings are perfectly rationalized in our model. In the absence of proportionality of power
sharing with respect to both strength and natural resources, conict can be very hard to
avoid, and we have shown which of the two criteria is responsible for the di¤erent types of
conict (see Corollary 2). Our results could be used to provide theoretical micro-foundations
for Collier and Rohner (2008)s empirical nding that democracy and power sharing mostly
decreases the risk of war in rich nations, but can actually lead to more political violence in
poor states (in which the "peace dividend" is smaller and s >  is more likely to hold).
8. Interestingly, a small level of  could in some instances be interpreted as "grievances" (or
"motives"). While approaches explaining the occurrence of conict with frustration from
relative deprivation have traditionally been inuential in political science (e.g., Gurr, 1970),
they have in recent years been challenged by rational choice frameworks mostly developed by
economists and focusing on "greed" or "feasibility" (see Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004; Collier,
Hoe­ er and Rohner, 2009, for a distinction of these approaches). Our model is able to
reconcile both intellectual traditions by taking motives into account in a game theoretic
framework of utility maximizing players.
9. In particular, conict outbreaks due to a failure to achieve resource proportionality could
be linked to "grievances", as they are related to some underlying conception of an "unfair"
natural resource distribution. In contrast, a violation of minimum strength proportionality
could be interpreted as "greed"-related factor. Interestingly, Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) have
interpreted their empirical nding that natural resources fuel civil conict as evidence in favor
of "greed"-based explanations, disregarding the role of grievances. Our reading of the resource
proportionality criterion revives grievances as contributing factor to wars. The model goes
even one step beyond that: It features the implication that grievances play a greater role in
secessionist conicts (where resource proportionality is crucial) than in centrist wars (where
the minimum strength proportionality matters heavily). This is in line with the empirical
evidence, as pointed out by Ross (2004b: 63): "Resources appear to play a di¤erent role
17
in separatist conicts than in nonseparatist conicts. Grievances over the distribution of
resource wealth helped initiate (...) separatist wars (...), but grievances of all types played no
role in (...) nonseparatist wars."
10. Further, our model also generates predictions about which kinds of natural resources are
particularly risky. As shown in Proposition 1, it becomes harder to maintain peace when
the natural resources of a country are very valuable, i.e., when r1 and r2 are large. This
prediction is in line with the empirical evidence suggesting that diamonds (Lujala, Gleditsch
and Gilmore, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010), oil (De Soysa, 2002; Ross, 2004; Fearon,
2005; Humphreys, 2005) and coca (Angrist and Kugler, 2008) are particularly conducive to
civil conict. Further, as mentioned above the model predicts that geographical concentration
of natural resources is risky. This can rationalize the peace threatening e¤ect of diamonds and
oil, which are essentially point resources that tend to be unevenly distributed in the terrain.
It is therefore not surprising that the oil-rich regions of e.g., Iraq, Nigeria or Indonesia and
diamond-rich countries like for example Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo
have traditionally been hotspots of conict.
11. Finally, our model can also be interpreted in a broader sense and be applied to regional inter-
state wars. The recent conict in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia can for example
be analyzed in terms of our framework. The unit of analysis is in this case the Caucasus.
The dominant power, Russia, corresponds to group j, while Georgia is the minority group
i. Natural resources are broadly interpreted, including rents from "strategic" geopolitical
location. Rents are signicant here, given that two major oil pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, cross Georgian territory.23 In terms of
the model these large geopolitical rents correspond to a high r1. As most "political inuence"
rents are appropriated by Russia,  is low. Thus, our model predicts "secessionist conict",
where sovereign Georgia attempts to break free of Russias zone of inuence, while Russia
ghts back to maintain its grip. In line with the predictions, in recent years Russia has fueled
separatist rebellion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which weakened Georgia and provided
Russia with a pretext for intervention. The recent military confrontation in August 2008 has
been the logical consequence of this process, and has consolidated Russias control of Caspian
oil.
23According to Alam (2002: 10), these "western routes for transporting oil and gas from the region are primarily
supported by the US in order to contain the Russian inuence and dominance in the region (...) and are intended to
bypass Iran and Russia. (The Baku-Supsa pipeline) terminates hardly 20 km away from Abkhazia".
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5 E¤ects of Uneven Natural Resource Abundance on the Ethnic
Group Level
The existing empirical literature on natural resources and civil war has two main weaknesses: First,
it only studies the e¤ects of the total amount of natural resources and not of their geographical
distribution. Second, it studies the impact of natural resource abundance mostly on the country
level rather than on the ethnic group level. On such an aggregate level of analysis there is much
unobserved heterogeneity in the data.
To address these concerns, we will now analyze the e¤ects of natural resource abundance on
conict with panel data on the ethnic group level. In particular we construct group level variables
that capture closely the expression r1=(r1 + r2) of the model. There is a small number of papers
in the literature that study conict on the ethnic group level (e.g., Walter, 2006), but these papers
either ignore natural resources or use a natural resource variable at the country-level, which does
not allow to capture unevenness of resource distribution. Hence, to the best of our knowledge
we are the rst to study civil war using a panel on the ethnic group level with natural resource
variables that vary for di¤erent ethnic groups.
To construct the dataset, we use as starting point the data of the "Minorities at Risk" (MAR)
project which follows a multitude of ethnic minority groups over several years. All data is explained
in detail in Appendix D. Below we focus on describing the construction of our novel independent
variable, the surface of an ethnic groups territory covered with oil and gas as a percentage of the
countrys total surface covered with oil and gas. This proxies very well r1=(r1 + r2).
First, we matched the ethnic groups in the MAR dataset with the ethnic groups in the "Geo-
referencing of ethnic groups" (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rod and Cederman, 2010), which al-
lowed us to know the geographical coordinates of where a given ethnic group settles. Then we
merged this with the geo-referenced petroleum dataset (PETRODATA) from Lujala, Rod and
Thieme (2007), which tells us where oil elds lie. Combining this information we were able to com-
pute a variable measuring which part of the territory occupied by a given ethnic group contains
oil. Expressing this in terms of the total surface containing oil in the country, we obtain a rather
precise measure of how relatively petrol-rich the homelands of a given ethnic group are.
As shown in the existing literature (e.g., Collier and Hoe­ er, 1998; Gartzke, 1999; Buhaug,
Gates and Lujala, 2009), we can think of war as a stochastic process, as some of the parameters of
the model may in each period be drawn from an underlying distribution. This allows us to estimate
the risk of war onset using logit regressions, which is standard in the conict literature.
In Table 1 we display the e¤ects of the groups relative resource abundance, which is a proxy
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inter-group Inter-group Inter-group Separatism Separatism
Conflict Conflict Conflict Index Index
Group's petrol / country's petrol (A) 1.09*** 0.40 -0.00 -0.39 0.56
(0.31) (0.47) (0.62) (0.27) (0.40)
Group's geographical concentration (B) 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.30*** 0.62***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.07) (0.11)
Group pet. / country pet. x group concent. (C) 1.41** 1.21 1.52*** 0.49
(0.66) (0.92) (0.35) (0.51)
Joint significance level (A) + (C) 1% 10% 1% 1%
Joint significance level (B) + (C) 1% 5% 1% 5%
Group's pop. as % of country's pop. 0.47 -1.63***
(0.71) (0.38)
Group different language 0.38** -0.10
(0.17) (0.10)
Group different race 0.00 -0.78***
(0.18) (0.11)
Group different religion 0.13 -0.56***
(0.16) (0.09)
Country's democracy (t-1) 0.01 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
Country's ln GDP per capita (t-1) -0.39*** -0.05
(0.09) (0.05)
Country's ln population (t-1) 0.30*** 0.64***
(0.06) (0.04)
Country's growth (t-1) -0.93 -2.98***
(1.06) (0.69)
Country's mountains as % territory -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Country's ethnic fractionalization -1.20*** -1.57***
(0.46) (0.27)
Observations 1732 1732 1334 3874 2416
Pseudo R2 0.0160 0.0188 0.0688 0.00825 0.128
Log likelihood -846.8 -844.4 -607.4 -4631 -2492
Note: Dependent variable: First row. Sample: 1990-2000. With intercept. Col. (1)-(3) logit, (4)-(5) ordered logit.  ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 1: Regressions with pooled panel
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inter-group Inter-group Inter-group Inter-group Inter-group
Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict
Group's petrol / country's petrol (A) 2.60* -1.88 44.29**
(1.34) (2.88) (21.55)
Group's geographical concentration (B) -0.03 -0.38
(0.30) (0.36)
Group pet. / country pet. x group conc. (C) 4.87*
(2.77)
Joint significance level (A) + (C) 5%
Joint significance level (B) + (C) 10%
Part of group's territory covered by petrol 146.64
(176.23)
Group's oil / country's oil 39.98**
(19.44)
Group's pop. as % of country's pop. 0.82 1.79
(1.58) (1.68)
Group different language -0.77** -0.65**
(0.31) (0.32)
Group different race -1.32*** -1.43***
(0.34) (0.35)
Group different religion 0.05 -0.08
(0.29) (0.29)
Country's democracy (t-1) 0.11** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Country's ln GDP per capita (t-1) 1.12* 1.11* 1.19* 1.24* 1.18*
(0.65) (0.65) (0.70) (0.69) (0.69)
Country's ln population (t-1) -9.73*** -9.79*** -11.15*** -10.48*** -11.03***
(2.98) (2.99) (3.26) (3.21) (3.25)
Country's growth (t-1) -2.14 -2.12 -2.42 -2.33 -2.41
(1.61) (1.61) (1.67) (1.67) (1.67)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Country FE Country FE Group FE Group FE Group FE
Observations 923 923 707 707 707
Pseudo R2 0.0721 0.0762 0.0684 0.0599 0.0675
Log likelihood -352.6 -351.0 -269.0 -271.4 -269.2
Note: Dependent variable: Inter-group conflict. Sample: 1990-2000. Logit with intercept in all columns.  ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2: Regressions including group xed e¤ects
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for r1=(r1 + r2), and group concentration, which is a proxy for ps=pc, on inter-group conict and
separatism. Our theory predicts that if the ethnic minority group is very resource rich relative to the
rest of the country and at the same time geographically very concentrated (which makes secession
"easier" than centrist conict), this given ethnic group is more likely to be involved in inter-group
conict or in secessionist rebellion. Hence, we expect a groups relative resource abundance to
induce a larger risk of conict, and this in particular when the group is geographically concentrated.
In other words, we expect the resource abundance (A) and its interaction term with concentration
(C) to be jointly positive and signicant. This is indeed the case. Similarly, our theory predicts
that increases in group concentration (B) lead to a higher conict risk, and the more so when the
groups homelands are relatively resource rich. This is indeed the case, given that (B) and (C)
are jointly positive and signicant. All the results are robust to the inclusion of various control
variables (described in Appendix D).
Table 2 includes rst country xed e¤ects and then group xed e¤ects, with the goal of ad-
dressing unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias.24 As before, more resource abundance
when groups are concentrated, and more group concentration when their regions are resource abun-
dant, will both continue to fuel the risk of conict, even when country xed e¤ects are included.
The group concentration variable is not time-varying on the group level. Therefore, when we
include group xed e¤ects (from column (3) onwards) this variable drops. But group xed e¤ects
allow us to check if resource unevenness continues to matter under very demanding conditions.
We nd that relative resource abundance of a given ethnic group remains a statistically signicant
predictor of inter-group conict. In column (4) we show that it is really the relative and not absolute
resource abundance of the ethnic group that matters and in column (5) we show that the results
are also robust if only oil (without gas) is included in the regressions.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple model to capture how the geographical distribution of natural
resources within a country can a¤ect the risk of civil conict of di¤erent types. We have allowed for
uneven resource abundance and two di¤erent forms of conict, secessionist and centrist, and found
that bargaining fails to prevent costly conict if an ethnic minority group is situated in a region
that is particularly rich in natural resources (relative to the rest of the country) and if its winning
probability for the case of secessionist conict is substantially larger than for centrist conict. This
24Note that in table 2 we focus exclusively on inter-group conict as dependent variable, given that the separatism
index used in columns (4) and (5) of table 1 is not time varying on the group level. Similarly, some control variables
that are not time varying on the country or group level are dropped in table 2.
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leads to the presence of two relevant threat points for war, which cannot be addressed at the same
time by bargaining.
The new simple theory of bargaining breakdown due to multiple types of conict is not only
interesting per se, in our opinion, but it is also shown to t very nicely with most existing empirical
ndings and with the estimations on our newly constructed data set with detailed geographic
information about ethnic groups and resources.
Future research could explore the implications of the dynamic extension of our game theoretic
framework, making the wealth and capacity stocks depend also on the accumulation of saved
resource rents and past wars. In such a dynamic setting we would expect that over time the world
moves from fewer and heterogeneous states to more and homogeneous states, in contrast with the
indications that one could draw by introducing economies of scale and the like (see e.g., Alesina
and Spolaore, 1997). Even though the dynamic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the
simplicity and tractability of our model should suggest that indeed this path of future research is
feasible and desirable, lending additional positive externality value to the present paper.
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Appendix A: The Optimal Alpha in the Frictionless Model
Dene the threshold   pc+ dwjnjr1+r2 , as an upper bound of government concessions that would still
make group j prefer peace to centrist conict.
Group i weakly prefers peace to centrist conict if   c  pc   dwinir1+r2 . Note that c < 
always holds. Hence if only centrist conict were considered as a possibility, there would be an
obvious Pareto frontier of intermediate values of  between these two that would avoid war if the
two players could bargain about .
Considering that another type of conict is possible, group i weakly prefers peace to secessionist
conict if   s  ps r1r1+r2  
dwin
1
i
r1+r2
. We restrict attention to the most interesting setting where
c > 0, s > 0. There are three cases to consider (recall that =probability that group i is drawn
as mover):
Case 1: pc > ps r1r1+r2 +
dwi(ni n1i )
r1+r2
=)  > c > s > 0
E(j( = 0)) =  [(1  pc)(r1 + r2)  dwjnj ] + (1  )(r1 + r2)
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E(j( = c)) = (1  c)(r1 + r2)
Group j would select  = c i¤ the following condition holds (and  = 0 otherwise):
 pc(1  )(r1 + r2) + dwini + dwjnj > 0
This condition holds when  is large enough. It is in this case always possible to guarantee a
peaceful outcome with  > 0, as there is only one relevant form of conict (C), under which the
sum of payo¤s is below the sum of payo¤s for peace.
Case 2: pc +
dwjnj
r1+r2
> ps
r1
r1+r2
  dwin1ir1+r2 > pc  
dwini
r1+r2
=)  > s > c > 0
E(j( = 0)) = 
 
(1  ps)r1 + r2   dwjn1j

+ (1  )(r1 + r2)
E(j( = s)) = (1  s)(r1 + r2)
Group j will select  = s i¤ the following condition holds (and  = 0 otherwise):
 ps(1  )r1 + dwin1i + dwjn1j > 0
This condition holds when  is large enough. It is again possible in this case to guarantee a peaceful
outcome, as there is only one relevant form of conict (S), under which the sum of payo¤s is below
the sum of payo¤s for peace.
Case 3: ps r1r1+r2 > pc +
d(win
1
i+wjnj)
r1+r2
=) s >  > c > 0
E(j( = 0)) = 
 
(1  ps)r1 + r2   dwjn1j

+ (1  )(r1 + r2)
E(j( = s)) = (1  s)(r1 + r2) + (1  ) [(1  pc)(r1 + r2)  dwjnj ]
Group j will select  = s i¤ the following condition holds (and  = 0 otherwise):
 pc(1  )(r1 + r2) + d(win1i + wjn1j )  (1  )dwjnj > 0
This condition holds when  is large enough. In this third case for both  = 0 or  = s there
will be conict for some draws and it is not possible to guarantee peace even in the presence of
credible transfers.
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Appendix B: Simultaneous Move Basic Model
The Escalation Case
Assume that groups move simultaneously, with the minority group i having the strategy space
fp; c; sg and the ruling group j having strategy space fp; cg. The prole (p; p) ! peace; (s; p) !
secessionist conict; in all other cases there is centrist conict. This is because it is always possible
to escalate a secessionist war into centrist all-out war. This ts well a situation where both ethnic
groups are somewhat dispersed and group j can force group i to ght a centrist war (for example
by "taking hostages") rather than allowing them to conne the conict to their own territory.
Assume further that there is some noise and accordingly group i plays trembling-hand perfect
strategies (or alternatively eliminates all weakly dominated strategies). In this scenario, even when
group j is expected to play c, group i will still select the action corresponding to its preferred
outcome (as there is a chance that group j deviates and plays p, in which case group is action
matters). As before, the thresholds c and s correspond to the lower bound for which group i
prefers peace, while  represents the upper-bound of  for which group j prefers peace to centrist
conict.
Case 1: pc > ps r1r1+r2 +
dwi(ni n1i )
r1+r2
=)  > c > s > 0
In this case for  = 0 the outcome is C, while for  = c the outcome is P . As,  > c we
know that group j will select  = c in equilibrium and the outcome will be P .
Case 2: pc +
dwjnj
r1+r2
> ps
r1
r1+r2
  dwin1ir1+r2 > pc  
dwini
r1+r2
=)  > s > c > 0
By symmetry, whenever group i prefers S to C (like in this second case), group j is better o¤ in
C than in S (for simplicity we focus here on the case where also ps r1r1+r2 > pc +
dwj(nj n1j )
r1+r2
holds).
Thus, for  = 0 the selected prole is (s; c), leading to C; whereas for  = s the outcome is P .
Hence, as  > s we obtain in equilibrium  = s and P .
Case 3: ps r1r1+r2 > pc +
d(win
1
i+wjnj)
r1+r2
=) s >  > c > 0
For  = 0 the selected prole is (s; c), leading to C; whereas for  = s the actions are (p; c),
resulting in C as well. Hence, we obtain in equilibrium  = f0; sg and C.
Bargaining failure occurs under the exact same conditions of Proposition 1.
When Secessionist Conict Cannot Be Escalated
Now consider the alternative scenario in which (p; p) ! P and secessionist conict takes place
whenever group i plays s (in all other cases there is centrist conict). This corresponds to situations
where the minority cannot be forced into centrist all-out conict (e.g., when no "hostage taking"
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is possible or e¤ective).
Case 1: pc > ps r1r1+r2 +
dwi(ni n1i )
r1+r2
=)  > c > s > 0
In this case for  = 0 the outcome is C, while for  = c the outcome is P . As  > c we know
that group j will select  = c in equilibrium and the outcome will be P .
Case 2: pc +
dwjnj
r1+r2
> ps
r1
r1+r2
  dwin1ir1+r2 > pc  
dwini
r1+r2
=)  > s > c > 0
For  = 0 we will observe S; whereas for  = s the outcome is P . Hence, as  > s we obtain
in equilibrium  = s and P .
Case 3: ps r1r1+r2 > pc +
d(win
1
i+wjnj)
r1+r2
=) s >  > c > 0
For  = 0 group i plays s resulting in S; whereas for  = s group i plays s (preemptive, to
avoid C), which leads again to S. Hence, we obtain in equilibrium  = f0; sg and S.
Once again the bargaining failure condition is the same as in Proposition 1, but
which conict will be observed depends on whether escalation is possible or not.
Appendix C: Accepted Secession in the Basic Model
A necessary condition for the occurrence of accepted secession is that dwjn1j  (1 ps)r1. Focusing
now on the cases in which this condition holds, we know that whenever group i proposes secession it
will be accepted by group j. Thus, the threshold for group i preferring s to p becomes a  r1r1+r2 .
Further, remember the threshold for j:   pc+ dwjnjr1+r2 . Thus, under the condition r1r1+r2 > pc+
dwjnj
r1+r2
we obtain a similar result as in the main text, but now for bargaining failing to prevent accepted
secession rather than secessionist conict.
Appendix D: Data
This appendix describes the data used in section 5.
Countrys democracy: Polity scores ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic). From Polity IV (2009).
Countrys ethnic fractionalization: From Walter (2006).
Countrys growth: Growth rate of GDP per capita at constant 2000 US$. From World Bank
(2009).
Countrys ln GDP per Capita: At constant 2000 US$. From World Bank (2009).
Countrys ln population: From World Bank (2009).
Countrys mountains as % territory: Percentage of territory covered by mountains. From
Collier, Hoe­ er, and Rohner (2009).
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Group di¤erent language: Dummy taking a value of 1 if an ethnic group speaks another language
than the dominant group(s) in society. From Minorities at Risk (2009) (coded as 1 if their variable
Lang takes values of 2 or 3).
Group di¤erent race: Dummy taking a value of 1 if an ethnic group is of another race than the
dominant group(s) in society. From Minorities at Risk (2009) (coded as 1 if their variable Race
takes values of 2 or 3).
Group di¤erent religion: Dummy taking a value of 1 if an ethnic group has a di¤erent religion
than the dominant group(s) in society. From Minorities at Risk (2009) (coded as 1 if their variable
Belief takes values of 2 or 3).
Groups geographical concentration: Dummy taking a value of 1 if the variable Groupcon from
Minorities at Risk (2009) is at least 3.
Groups oil / countrys oil: Like Groups petrol / countrys petrol, but excluding natural gas.
Groups petrol / countrys petrol: As described in the main text.
Group population as % of country population: From Walter (2006).
Inter-group conict: Dummy taking a value of 1 if the variable Comco from Minorities at Risk
(2009) is at least 3.
Part of groups territory covered with petrol: Same sources as for Groups petrol / countrys
petrol, but captures the % of a groups territory that is covered by petrol.
Separatism index: Variable Sepx from Minorities at Risk (2009).
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